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Corporate Finance and the Monetary Transmission
Mechanism
Abstract
We analyze the transmission eﬀects of monetary policy in a gen-
eral equilibrium model of the financial sector, with bank lending and
securities markets. Bank lending is constrained by capital adequacy
requirements and asymmetric information adds a cost to outside bank
equity capital. In our model, monetary policy does not aﬀect bank
lending through changes in bank liquidity; but rather, it operates
through changes in the spread of bank loans over corporate bonds,
which induce changes in the aggregate composition of financing by
firms, and in banks’ equity-capital base. The model produces multiple
equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a “credit crunch.”
J.E.L. No(s): G32, E50
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1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the monetary transmission mechanism through
the financial sector, in particular the banking sector and securities markets.
Specifically, it analyzes the eﬀects of open market operations on bank lending
and securities issues in a real economy. By building on recent advances in
the microeconomics of banking it provides some underpinnings for the “credit
view” of monetary policy, which, in its simplest form, relies on an exogenously
assumed limited substitutability between bank loans and bonds.
The macroeconomics literature distinguishes between the “money view”
and “credit view” of monetary policy transmission (Bernanke and Blinder,
1988 and 1992). The money view takes bonds and loans to be perfect substi-
tutes and only allows for eﬀects of monetary policy on aggregate investment,
consumption, and savings through changes in interest rates. The credit view
allows for an additional eﬀect on investment and economic activity operat-
ing through bank credit supply controlled through changes in bank reserve
requirements. Two critical assumptions underlying the credit view are that
firms cannot easily substitute bank loans for bonds, and banks cannot substi-
tute reservable liabilities (deposits) and non-reservable liabilities (bank bond
issues).
Our contribution in this paper is to point to another channel operating
through bank equity-capital. This channel works not only through the equi-
librium composition of funding between direct and intermediated finance but
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also through banks’ incentives to raise equity-capital. In our model banks
are capital constrained in equilibrium since equity capital is more costly than
other sources of funding like deposits or bonds. Banks are economizing on
their cost of funding by holding no more than the required amount of equity
capital. In addition, banks limit the size of their equity issues in an eﬀort to
economize their cost of capital.
The reason why equity capital has a higher cost than other sources of
funding in our model is due to asymmetric information and information di-
lution costs as in Myers and Majluf (1984). That is, when a bank decides to
raise additional equity through a seasoned oﬀer, the market tends to under-
value the issue for the better banks. But since it is the better banks that drive
the decision whether to raise equity, the overall eﬀect on all banks’ equity
issues (whether good or bad) is to reduce the amount of equity raised relative
to the full information optimum. Thus, because of information asymmetries
about the true value of bank assets, there is an endogenous cost of equity,
and by extension an endogenous cost of bank lending. Hence, banks’ equity
base (which includes retained earnings) is a key variable in determining the
total amount of bank credit.
An important consequence of this endogenous cost of equity is that mul-
tiple equilibria may exist. In one equilibrium the endogenous cost of capital
(generated by self fulfilling market beliefs) is high while in the other it is low.
The former has all the main features of a “credit crunch”1, namely that: i)
bank lending is limited by a lower endogenous stock of bank capital; ii) there
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is a correspondingly lower volume of bank credit, and; iii) equilibrium bank
spreads are high.2 In contrast, the other equilibrium has a high stock of bank
capital, a high volume of credit and lower equilibrium bank spreads.
Another way of thinking about this multiplicity of equilibria is in terms
of hysteresis in market beliefs about underlying bank values. Starting from a
low level of equilibrium bank capital, a single bank’s decision to issue equity
is likely to be interpreted by the market as a bad signal about the issuing
bank’s value (resulting in a reduction in the market price of bank equity),
thus inhibiting new equity issues. Vice-versa, in a situation where most banks
are expanding their capital base, a failure to expand will be interpreted as a
negative signal. This is the source of multiplicity of equilibria in our model.
This multiplicity of equilibria can give rise to potentially large monetary
policy transmission eﬀects if a change in monetary stance induces a switch
from one equilibrium to another. One possible scenario, for example, is for a
tightening in monetary policy to push the economy from an equilibrium with
a high equity-capital base and high levels of bank lending into a credit crunch
equilibrium, with a low equity-capital base and low levels of bank lending.
How can this happen? One eﬀect of monetary tightening in our model is to
reduce equilibrium bank spreads. Once those spreads hit a critically low level
it is no longer worth for banks to maintain a high equity-capital base. In
other words, the high equity-capital and high lending equilibrium is no longer
sustainable, and only the credit crunch equilibrium can arise for suﬃciently
low bank spreads. If there is hysteresis, as described above, then once the
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economy has settled in a credit crunch equilibrium, a major change in interest
rates may be required to pull it out of this low lending equilibrium. That is,
the economy may be stuck in the ineﬃcient equilibrium as long as market
beliefs are unchanged.
An important eﬀect of monetary policy that our analysis highlights is
related to the financial composition of the corporate sector between securi-
ties issues and bank credit. Recent empirical work suggests that one eﬀect
of monetary policy is to change firms’ financing decisions, with corporations
substituting bank lending for commercial paper issues. A common expla-
nation for these changes is that when bank cash reserves are tight, firms
turn to the securities market to raise funds (see Kashyap and Stein (1994)
and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)). Our article, however, identifies a diﬀerent
and more complex transmission mechanism, which operates through bank
equity-capital constraints as opposed to bank reserves.
The corporate finance side of our model builds on the more detailed analy-
sis of our related paper (Bolton and Freixas, 2000). What distinguishes bank
debt from corporate bond financing in our model is the flexibility of the two
modes of financing: bank debt is easier to restructure but because bank cap-
ital (and therefore bank loans) is in short supply, there is an endogenous
cost of flexibility. In other words, what makes bank loans expensive is the
existence of a capital requirement regulation together with a dilution cost
for outside equity. This, along with direct costs of running banks, is the
source of the positive equilibrium spread between bank loans and bonds in
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our model.
Firms with higher default risk are willing to pay this intermediation cost
because they have a greater benefit of flexibility. This is where monetary
policy aﬀects the composition of financing: by raising real interest rates and
thus lowering the equilibrium bank spread it induces some marginal firms to
switch from bond financing to bank borrowing. This increase in the demand
for bank loans is, however, oﬀset by a decrease in bank lending at the other
end of the risk spectrum to the riskiest firms, so that aggregate bank lending
remains unaﬀected as long as bank equity-capital remains unchanged.
In our model, the impact of monetary policy on aggregate investment
is thus more complex than in other models of the bank-lending channel.
A tightening of monetary policy not only results in the usual increase in
interest rates, but also gives rise to a decrease in spreads on bank loans.
These two eﬀects in turn induce a reduction in corporate securities issues
and an improvement in the risk composition of bank loans. The latter eﬀect
is due to the fact that the riskier firms are ‘priced out’ of the bank credit
market because, with lower spreads, bank loans are cheaper relative to bonds
than before. As a result, some safer firms switch away from bonds to bank
loans, thus ‘crowding out’ the riskier firms. The second major eﬀect of a
monetary tightening, as we show in proposition 4, is on bank equity-capital
issues (and thus on overall bank lending) which are reduced due to the lower
profitability of banks.
Most of the predictions of our model are consistent with empirical find-
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ings in the banking literature. In particular, using a uniquely detailed data
set from the Bank of Italy, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) find that cross-
sectional diﬀerences in bank lending responses to monetary policy relate to
diﬀerences in equity-capital constraints, thus providing support for a bank
capital channel. Also, Berger and Udell (1992) have shown that the spread
of commercial bank loans over Treasury rates (either nominal or real) is a de-
creasing function of the Treasury rates, as our analysis predicts. Their study
suggests a number of possible explanations for this finding. Interestingly,
although this is not our objective here, our paper suggests a new reason for
the observed commercial loan rates stickiness.
Several related recent papers also deal with monetary policy transmis-
sion through a bank lending channel. The four most closely related ones are
Gorton and Winton (1999), Van den Heuvel (1999), Schneider (1998) and
Estrella (2001). The first two papers focus on banks’ capital adequacy con-
straints and the macroeconomic eﬀects of changes in bank lending induced by
changes in banks’ equity base. Bank capital is costly in Gorton and Winton
because bank equity is risky and requires both a risk and liquidity premium.
Capital adequacy constraints impose a cost on banks whenever investors’ op-
timal portfolio is less heavily weighted towards bank equity than is required
by regulations. This is most likely to occur in recessions. Accordingly the
amplification eﬀects of monetary policy are greatest at the onset of a reces-
sion, when higher interest rates aﬀect aggregate investment both directly and
indirectly through a reduction in bank lending capacity.
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In Van den Heuvel it is assumed that there is an imperfect market for
banks’ equity which implies that bank cannot readily raise new equity. Still,
they can increase their capital stock through retained earnings. The amplifi-
cation eﬀects of monetary policy then work through their eﬀects on retained
earnings. While Van den Heuvel’s microeconomic model of banking is more
rudimentary than that of Gorton and Winton his dynamic macroeconomic
analysis goes considerably further, exploring lagged eﬀects of changes in in-
terest rates. In the same vein, Schneider provides an extensive dynamic
macroeconomic analysis, which relies on a combination of liquidity and bank
capital eﬀects. Finally, Estrella provides a similar dynamic analysis focussing
on the cyclical eﬀect of Value at Risk regulation.
Neither of these models, however, allows for other sources of corporate
financing besides bank lending and therefore cannot explore composition ef-
fects of monetary policy.3 Nor do these models allow for multiple equilibria
and the possibility of what we describe as a “credit crunch” equilibrium,
where bank lending is constrained by investors’ excessive pessimism about
banks’ underlying asset values.
Romer and Romer (1990) observe that if banks are able to obtain funds
by tapping financial markets, then monetary policy would aﬀect banks only
through changes in interest rates. There would be no specific bank lending
channel. In response to Romer and Romer (1990), Lucas and McDonald
(1992) and Stein (1998) have argued that non-deposit liabilities are imperfect
substitutes for deposit liabilities (which are subject to reserve requirements)
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when banks have private information about their net worth. They show
that when certificates of deposit (CDs) are risky then banks are unable to
perfectly substitute CDs for deposits, so that bank lending may be partially
controlled by monetary authorities through changes in reserve requirements.
Our model emphasizes instead the imperfect substitutability of equity capital
with other sources of funds, and highlights that there is a bank lending
channel operating through the bank equity-capital market even when banks
have perfect access to the CD or bond market.
Since our model allows for the coexistence of bank lending and securities
markets it is also related to a third set of papers by Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997), Repullo and Suarez (2000) and Bolton and Freixas (2000), which all
characterize equilibria where bank lending and direct financing through se-
curities issues are both present. The latter three papers take intermediation
costs to be exogenous and do not analyze the eﬀects of monetary policy on
bank equity-capital. A major diﬀerence with these papers is thus that our
model allows for an endogenous level of bank capital. This is obtained at
the price of some simplifying assumptions. Still, our model can be straight-
forwardly extended to allow for diﬀerent initial levels of bank capital across
banks.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the description
of the model while Section 3 deals with banks lending and their asset/liability
structure. Section 4 characterizes the general equilibrium when banks’ equity
is fixed and Section 5 endogenizes the supply of bank equity and shows how
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a “credit crunch” equilibrium may obtain. Section 6 considers comparative
statics and the eﬀects of monetary policy. Finally, Section 7 oﬀers some
concluding comments. The proofs of most results are given in an appendix.
2 The model
We consider a real economy with a single consumption or production good,
which can be thought of as wheat. Monetary policy in this economy operates
through open market operations (Government bond issues G) that aﬀect
interest rates on Government Bills. For simplicity, the nominal side of this
economy is not explicitly modeled.
2.1 Firms’ investment projects and financial options
Each firm has one project requiring an investment outlay I > 1 at date t = 0.
The project yields a return of V > I when it succeeds. When it fails the
project can generate a value v, as long as the firm is restructured. If the
firm is unable to restructure its debts following failure then the value of the
project is zero.
Firms’ owner-managers investW < I in the firm andmust raise I−W = 1
from outside. Firms diﬀer in the observable probabilities p of success, where
we assume that p is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]
Firms can choose to finance their project by either issuing bonds or by
means of a bank loan. To keep the corporate financing side of the model to
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its bare essentials, we do not allow firms to issue equity or to combine bonds
and bank debt.4 The main distinguishing features of these two instruments
are the following:
1. bond financing: a bond issue specifies a time t = 1 repayment to
bond holders of R(p). If the firm is unable to meet this repayments the
firm is declared bankrupt and is liquidated. Restructuring of debt is
not possible because of the wide dispersion of ownership of corporate
bonds (see e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)).
2. bank debt: a bank loan specifies a repayment bR(p). If the firm defaults
following failure of the project, the bank is able to restructure the firm’s
debts and obtain a restructuring value of at most v.5
As we will show, in equilibrium firms will be segmented by risk classes in
their choice of funding, with all firms with p ∈ (p∗, 1] choosing bond financing
and all firms with p ∈ [0, p∗] preferring a bank loan.6 Bond financing is
preferred by low risk firms (with a high p) because these firms are less likely
to fail at date t = 1 and therefore have less of a need for the costly debt
restructuring services provided by banks. These services are costly because
banks themselves need to raise funds to be able to lend to firms.7
Having described the demand side for capital by firms we now turn to a
description of the supply side.
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2.2 Households
There is a continuum of households in our economy represented by the unit
interval [0, 1], with utility function
U(C1, C2) = log(1 + C1) + log(1 + C2)
Each household is endowed with one unit of good. For a given fixed gross
real interest rate, RG, aggregate investment and savings in this economy are
determined by households’ optimal savings decisions. That is, households
determine their optimal savings s = (1 − C1) by maximizing their utility





It is straightforward to check that households’ optimal savings function
is then given by




Households can invest their savings either in bank deposit accounts, in
bonds issued by firms, in government bonds, or in bank equity. We denote
the supply of deposits by D(RD) (with 0 ≤ D(RD) ≤ 1− 12RG ), where RD is
the remuneration of deposits. We allow for perfect substitutability between
deposit accounts and financial assets. For positive amounts of both deposits
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and bonds, this will lead to the no arbitrage condition8
RG = RD.
Given this no arbitrage condition, henceforth we refer to RG as both the
interest rate set on government bills and the remuneration on deposits. We
will assume that bond returns and bank returns are independently distributed
and that customers hold perfectly diversified portfolios. This simplifies the
analysis by allowing us to model investments in an aggregate bond and bank
equity portfolio as providing an essentially safe return. No arbitrage then
also requires that the expected return on bonds pR(p) is such that:
pR(p) = RG. (1)
2.3 Banks
Banks, as firms, are run by self-interested managers, who have invested their
personal wealth w in the bank. They can operate on a small scale by leverag-
ing only their own capital w with (insured) deposits D, so as to fund a total




≥ κ > 0.
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Alternatively, banks can scale up their operations by raising outside equity-
capital E to be added to their own investment w. In that case their lending
capacity expands from wκ to
w+E
κ . However, when they raise outside equity
they may face informational dilution costs. Outside equity investors, having
less information about the profitability of bank loans will tend to misprice
banks’ equity issues. In particular, they will underprice equity issues of the
most profitable banks. We assume that banks choose an amount of equity




, where E <∞.10
Because banks are perfectly diversified they have a zero probability of
default, a simplifying assumption that allow us to sidestep the complexities
associated with banks’ credit risk.
Banks face unit operating costs c > 0. These costs are best interpreted
as operating costs banks must incur to attract depositors and potential bor-
rowers, and may also be thought of as screening costs the bank incurs on
each loan to determine the probability of success p. Thus, these costs are
incurred, whether the bank ends up extending loans to firms or not.
To model bank dilution costs of equity-capital we take as a basic premise
that bank managers diﬀer in their ability to profitably run their bank. Specif-
ically, we assume that bank managers may be either good or bad. Good bank
managers (or type H-banks in our notation) are able to squeeze out a return
v from restructuring a defaulting firm, while bad bank managers (or L-banks)
can only obtain a return βv, (1 > β > 0). There are obviously other perhaps
more plausible ways of modeling the diﬀerence between good and bad banks,
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but the appeal of our formulation is its simplicity. Banks’ outside investors
do not know the bank’s type; all they know is that any bank they face is an
L-bank with probability μ and an H-bank with probability 1−μ. This infor-
mational asymmetry about bank type gives rise to mispricing of each bank
type’s equity. It is the main source of costs of bank capital in our model.
A bank manager seeks to maximize his wealth and cares both about bank
profits and the bank’s share price. The reason why a bank manager cares
about share price is that he may need to sell his stake in the bank before the
returns of the bank’s loans are fully realized and known.
We model these objectives by assuming that bank managers may need to
liquidate their stake in the bank at date t = 2− with probability λ ∈ (0, 1).
Denoting by q the share price of the bank and by Π2 the bank’s accumulated
profit up to period t = 2, the bank manager’s objective is then to maximize11
max [q, λq + (1− λ)Π2] .
If the manager is running an L−bank and he knows that Π2 < q (based on
his private information) then he will always sell his stake at date t = 2−
and he will only care about the bank’s share price. If, on the other hand,
he is running an H−bank such that Π2 > q then he will seek to maximize
λq + (1− λ)Π2.
Having determined the banks’ objectives, their investment opportunities
and their sources of funds, we now can turn to an analysis of their optimal
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lending policy and asset-liability structure given fixed market terms.
Before doing so we briefly summarize the sequence of moves and events,
and also recall the underlying information structure.
2.4 Timing
The following time line illustrates the order of decisions (see Figure 1).
1. At date t = 1
• The Government sets G, announces an interest rate RG and firms
issuing bonds quote their terms R(p).
• Banks quote their lending terms bR(p) to firms and choose the
amount of new equity they want to issue, E.
• Firms who prefer bank lending apply for a loan, those preferring
bond financing tap financial markets.
• Banks make their portfolio decision. In particular, they decide
what proportion of their funds to invest in new loans and what
proportion in government or corporate bonds. These decisions are
unobservable to investors.
• Households determine the fraction of their endowment they want
to save, and the proportion of their savings they want to hold as
deposits and in direct investments.
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2. At date t = 2− firms’ returns are realized. Those firms whose project
has failed may be restructured if they have been financed with a bank
loan.
Bank managers have the option to sell their equity stake in the sec-
ondary market.
3. At the end of date t = 2 all remaining debts as well as dividends are
paid and households consume their net income.
3 Bank Lending and Optimal Asset-Liability
Structure
As we shall establish, in our model only pooling equilibria (where L-banks
mimic H-banks) exist.12 There may, of course, be many such equilibria. But,
as we explain in Section 5, it is reasonable to focus on the pooling equilibria
that are best forH-banks. Accordingly, we shall consider optimal lending and
asset-liability management from the perspective of H-banks, who know that
their observable actions are mimicked by L-banks (in a pooling equilibrium).
An H-bank contemplating an equity issue faces the following trade-oﬀ.
If it issues equity it can increase lending and thus raise profits, but since its
equity is undervalued in the financial market the bank’s manager does not
appropriate the entire increase in profits. Depending on the profitability of
loans and the extent of the undervaluation of equity the H-bank may or may
18
not decide to relax it’s lending constraint by issuing more equity. Thus, to
determine an H-bank’s choice we need to specify the profitability of loans
and the extent of dilution.
3.1 Optimal Lending Policy
In a pooling equilibrium H-banks quote lending terms bR(p) to equalize the
expected profit on every loan they make. We denote by ρH the expected net
excess return per loan for H-banks over government bonds. The reason why
the spread on each loan for an H-bank must be the same at an optimum is
that otherwise anH-bank could increase its profit by lending only to the firms
with the highest spread. The spread ρH corresponds to the rents banks earn
because of the specific role their funding plays in restructuring and because
of the limited amount of capital they may have:
ρH = p bR(p) + (1− p)v −RG (2)
Note that given these lending terms, H-banks get a higher return per loan
than L-banks. Indeed, the expected return on a loan with success probability
p for an L-bank is only
p bR(p) + (1− p)βv −RG. (3)
Given the expected net excess return per loan over government bonds
ρH and given rates on government bonds and bank deposits of RG, an H-
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bank chooses its optimal mix of loans L and government bond holdings Gb






{L(RG + ρH − c) + (Gb −D(RG))RG}
subject to:
L+Gb = D(RG) + w +E (AL)
L ≤ 1κ(w +E) (κ)
where, (AL) is the asset-liability accounting identity and D(RG) satisfies
0 ≤ D(RG) ≤ 1− 12RG .
Note first that since the cost of raising funds through bank bond issues
or bank deposits is the same, we are only able to determine the net amount
of bonds minus deposits (positive or negative) the bank holds: Gb −D(RG).
Second, it is easy to see from this program that the capital adequacy
constraint is always binding if ρH > c. Indeed, if the excess return on bank
lending is strictly positive, an H-bank can always make a profit by raising an
extra dollar and investing it in a bank loan. If, on the other hand, ρH < c,
then it is best for the bank not to lend at all to firms and to invest only in
the market.
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We summarize these observations in the lemma below.
Lemma 1: The optimal amount of lending for an H-bank is L = (w+E)κ
if ρH > c and L = 0 if ρH < c.
This lemma highlights that banks’ optimal lending policy and asset-
liability structure is such that their equity capital base is always a binding
constraint on their lending capacity. Thus, in response to an increase in
spreads, banks can only increase lending if they also increase their equity-
capital base. Thus, it becomes essential to consider how banks’ capital base
is determined.
An important implication of this lemma is that monetary policy cannot
aﬀect bank lending by changing bank reserves (while keeping interest rates
fixed). In other words, the classical bank lending channel of monetary policy
is absent. As has already been noted by Romer and Romer (1990), when
banks can perfectly substitute non reservable liabilities for reservable ones,
as in our model, monetary authorities can no longer control bank lending
by controlling bank reserves. Bond issues may, of course, be imperfect sub-
stitutes for insured deposits if there is a risk of default, as Stein (1998) has
noted. However, this imperfect substitutability of risky bonds for safe de-
posits is only a necessary condition for bank liquidity to aﬀect bank lending.
It is not suﬃcient if capital adequacy constraints remain binding.
Indeed, if we introduce reserve requirements into our model, by requir-
ing banks to hold a fraction ϕ ∈ (0, 1) of their deposits as cash-on-hand
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(remunerated or not remunerated), and if we introduce an imperfect substi-
tutability between bonds and insured deposits by, say, adding a small spread
π > 0 on bank bond issues (so that a dollar raised in bonds costs the bank
RG + π), then the eﬀect would mainly be to raise the bank’s overall cost of
funds. But as long as bank spreads ρH remain suﬃciently high, banks would
continue to raise funds up to the point where the capital constraint binds.
Thus, when the central bank changes reserve requirements on deposits, by
changing ϕ, the only immediate eﬀect is on bank profitability. It cannot aﬀect
bank lending if the capital constraint remains binding. Of course, profitabil-
ity eventually or indirectly aﬀects the availability of capital, so that there
may be an indirect or lagged eﬀect on lending as in Van den Heuvel (1999).
These points are made more formally in Section 6 dealing with comparative
statics.
Our result that bank equity capital is always a binding constraint on bank
lending appears to be counterfactual, as banks generally have a higher capital
base than is required by BIS regulations. However, we show in the appendix
that the fact equity capital is higher than is strictly required at any point in
time, does not necessarily mean that banks’ capital constraint is not binding.
The point is that if banks anticipate that their role as providers of flexible
financing requires extending future lending to firms (as part of their loan
commitments) then they will hold capital reserves in anticipation of those
future loan increases. This is why they may appear to be unconstrained,
while in fact their equity base may actually constrain current lending. Intro-
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ducing this idea formally into our model would have significantly increased
its complexity. This is why we have chosen not to introduce it. Instead, we
briefly describe the main changes to be made to the model to obtain a time
0 non-binding capital constraint in the appendix.
4 General Equilibrium in the credit market
In this section we take banks’ equity-capital as given and determine equilib-
rium rates RG and bR(p) (or equivalently R(p) = RGp and ρH) such that:
1. the aggregate demand for bank credit is equal to aggregate supply,
2. the aggregate demand for bank equity, corporate and government bonds
is equal to the supply of funds to the securities markets,
3. bank demand for deposits equals deposit supply.
Since this last condition is met by setting RD = RG, for a given level of
equity issues E, our equilibrium analysis boils down to solving a system of
two equations in two unknowns, RG ≥ 1 and ρH ≥ 0.13
The only diﬃculty in this analysis lies in constructing the aggregate de-
mand and supply functions. Once these functions are determined, we can
define two equilibrium schedules as functions of RG and ρH , one for the bank
credit market and one for the securities markets. We then end up with a
simple system of two equations as depicted in Figure 2, which can be solved
straightforwardly.
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Intuitively, to see why the credit market schedule is downward sloping
note that any increase in RG which is not oﬀset by a decrease in ρH results
in an overall increase in the cost of bank credit. This increase results in a
drop in aggregate eﬀective demand for bank credit, as the marginal riskiest
firms get priced out of the market. But, for a constant ρH , aggregate supply
of bank lending remains unchanged. Therefore, to maintain equilibrium in
the credit market a fall in ρH is required. Similarly, the securities market
schedule is upward sloping because any increase in RG raises aggregate sav-
ings. When banks’ equity capital E remains unchanged, banks’ demand for
deposits remains unchanged following an increase in RG, so that household
demand for securities has to increase. To meet this increase in demand, firms
must raise their supply of bonds, which in turn requires an increase in ρH
(see Figure 2).
4.1 Equilibrium in the bank credit market
We focus our analysis on equilibria in the credit market such that: (i) risky
firms who cannot get a bank loan are also unable to get junk-bond financing
and, (ii) all bank types lend up to capacity.14
4.1.1 Firms funding choice
This equilibrium is such that all firms with a probability of default (1− p) >
(1 − pB) do not get any financing, all firms with a probability of default
(1 − pB) ≥ (1 − p) ≥ (1− p∗) get bank financing, and all firms with a very
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low probability of default, (1− p∗) > (1− p), get bond financing.
We now turn to a characterization of this equilibrium. Note first that,
since firms do not appropriate any returns from restructuring, their demand
for funds is simply driven by the cost of borrowing. A firm of risk character-
istics p demands a bank loan if and only if
bR(p)−R(p) ≤ 0
Using equations (1) and (2), this is equivalent to:
ρH − (1− p)v
p
≤ 0




prefers a bank loan to a bond issue, and any firm with a probability of success
larger than p∗ prefers to issue bonds.
This is quite intuitive. Banks obtain a rent from restructuring firms.
Their comparative advantage is therefore higher when they face a riskier
firm, which is more likely to go through a restructuring.15
While all firms with p < p∗ apply for a bank loan not all of these will be
granted one. Indeed, some of these firms may be too risky and have too low
a rating p to be worth investing in.16 The threshold pB below which firms
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do not obtain credit is given by
pBV + (1− pB)v = RG + ρH . (4)
4.1.2 The demand for loans
Under our assumption that p is uniformly distributed on the unit interval,
the mass of firms with p ≤ pB, which cannot get any funding at the cost of
funds (RG + ρH) is given by:17
pB(RG + ρH) =
RG + ρH − v
V − v (5)
And the aggregate demand for bank loans, comprising all firms with p ∈








RG + ρH − v
V − v
¶
4.1.3 The supply of loans
Equilibrium in the bank credit market requires that the aggregate supply of
bank credit L(RG, ρH) equals this aggregate eﬀective demand, p∗(RG,ρH)−
pB(RG,ρH).
When ρH > 0 all H-banks supply as much credit as they can given their
equity-capital stock. As we pointed out above, this is not necessarily true for
L-banks, however. These banks only prefer to lend to the corporate sector if
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the return on their loans exceeds the return on bonds:
p bR(p) + (1− p)βv ≥ RG,
or
ρH − (1− p)(1− β)v ≥ 0.
Notice that, in contrast to H-banks, the expected net excess return per
loan over government bonds for L-banks is higher for loans with a lower risk
of default. Therefore L-banks concentrate on the safer segment of the bank-
loan market and cover a risk-segment [pL, p∗], where pL > pB is defined by
the equation






when L-banks lend up to capacity. The RHS of this equation represents
the maximum aggregate supply of loans by L-banks and the LHS is the
aggregate demand for bank loans by the safest segment of firms seeking bank
financing.
4.1.4 Equilibrium in the credit market
The aggregate supply of bank-credit in the equilibrium where all banks lend
to capacity is given by L = w+Eκ . In this equilibrium we have a schedule for
the bank credit market given by:























− RG + ρH − v










(V − v) + v −RG
Rearranging we obtain the desired expression.
Notice that the equilibrium schedule (7) is independent of G. The reason
is that banks do not compete directly with the government bond market
in the equilibria we focus on. They only compete with the corporate bond
market. Notice also that the schedule (7) defines a decreasing linear function
in RG. That is, a higher RG is associated with a lower equilibrium spread ρH .
The reason is that, with a fixed supply of bank loans (constrained by bank
equity capital E), demand for bank loans can stay equal to supply only if an
increase in RG is partially oﬀset by a decrease in ρH . An equilibrium where
L-banks lend to capacity and where aggregate loan-supply is L(ρH) =
w+E
κ
can be obtained when the equilibrium spread ρ∗H is suﬃciently high. We
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provide a suﬃcient condition under which such an equilibrium exists below.
4.2 Securities market equilibrium
Securities markets clear when aggregate bond issues by the highest rated
firms with total mass (1−p∗(RG, ρH)) together with government bond issues
G and equity issues by banksE are equal to the aggregate supply of household
savings (net of deposits) invested in financial markets [1 − 1
2RG
− D (RG)]
plus aggregate investments by the banking sector in government bonds Gb.
Equating aggregate demand and supply of securities we therefore obtain:
Lemma 3: The equilibrium securities market schedule relating ρH to RG
is given by:















Proof: The securities market equilibrium condition is given by:
1− 1
2RG
−D (RG) = 1− p∗(RG, ρH) +E +G−Gb (10)
Replacing p∗(RG, ρH) by its value and replacing (D−Gb) by (w+E)( 1κ −1),
29













Rearranging we obtain the desired expression.
Thus, the securities market equilibrium condition defines an increasing
concave schedule ρSH (RG) parameterized by G. The reason why the schedule
is increasing in RG is that any increase in RG raises household savings. To be
able to invest these increased savings in corporate bonds there has to be an
equivalent increase in corporate bond issues. These issues, in turn, can only
come from firms that otherwise would have taken out a bank loan. Thus, to
get these firms to switch away from bank loans to bond issues there has to
be an increase in the relative cost of bank loans; that is, an increase in ρH .
Similarly, the reason why the schedule is concave in RG is that the household
savings function is concave in RG.
Finally, notice that an increase in G induces a downward shift in the
equilibrium schedule (9). The reason is that the corporate bond market
also competes for household savings against the government bond market.
Therefore, any increase in government bond issues must be met in part by
an increase in savings (requiring in turn an increase in interest rates RG),
and by a contraction in corporate bond issues (requiring a reduction in ρH).
A general equilibrium in the securities and bank loan markets (ρ∗H , R
∗
G)
is obtained when the two functions ρCH (RG) and ρSH (RG) intersect (as shown
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in Figure 2). In the next subsection we give two suﬃcient conditions which
guarantee the existence of a unique general equilibrium with maximal bank
lending.
4.3 Existence
We now establish that a unique general equilibrium (ρ∗H , R
∗
G) with maximum























The first condition guarantees that the two functions ρCH (RG) and ρSH (RG)
intersect for some RG ≥ 1. The second condition guarantees that the equi-
librium spread is suﬃciently high that both H and L−banks want to lend to
capacity. As is easily seen, these two conditions are satisfied within a range
of G. If G is too low the two functions ρCH (RG) and ρSH (RG) may intersect
only for RG < 1. But we must have RG ≥ 1 for households to invest any
savings in firms. Similarly, if G is too large the second condition is violated.
In that case government borrowing is so large and equilibrium interest rates
RG so high that ρH is too low to make it profitable for L−banks to lend to
the corporate sector.
The two conditions also hold for a range of bank equity-capital, w or
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(w+E). If bank-equity capital is too large bank loan supply to the corporate
sector is so large that the loan market cannot clear with a spread ρH that
is high enough to induce L−banks to engage in maximal lending to the
corporate sector. Note, finally, that assumption A2 is more likely to hold
for a lower μ and a higher β. This is again easy to understand intuitively.
A lower μ means that the mass of L−banks is smaller. Other things equal,
therefore, any L−bank is able to lend to a better risk-pool (pL is higher),
which raises the return on corporate lending. Similarly, a higher β raises the
return on lending for L−banks.
Proposition 1: Under assumptions A1 and A2 a unique maximum
bank-lending equilibrium (R∗G, ρ
∗
H) exists.
Proof: Notice first that forRG suﬃciently large we always have ρCH (RG) <
ρSH (RG) (this is obvious from Figure 2). Next we will prove that under as-
sumptionA1 ρCH (1) ≥ ρSH (1), and when this inequality holds the two equilib-
rium schedules can only intersect at some RG ≥ 1. To show ρCH (1) ≥ ρSH (1) ,
subtracting equation (9) from (7) we obtain the:



















an inequality implied by assumption A1.
Second, when assumption A2 holds we have ρCH (1) ≥ (1 − pL)(1 − β)v
so that even at a spread ρCH (1), L−banks prefer to lend up to capacity to
the corporate sector. A fortiori, then they are lending to capacity at the






Having established the existence of a unique general equilibrium for a
fixed equity-capital base for banks (w+E) that satisfy assumptions A1 and
A2 we now turn to the endogenous determination of banks’ equity-capital.
To guarantee the existence of an equilibrium with endogenous equity issues
we shall take it that assumptions A1 and A2 hold for all E ∈ [0, E¯].
5 Endogenous bank equity
In this section we take into account banks’ incentives to issue equity and allow
for the endogenous determination of bank-equity capital. Banks’ incentives to
issue equity depend on the equilibrium beliefs of investors. We therefore face
the standard equilibrium problem of the joint determination of equilibrium
strategies and beliefs.
When banks must pay a premium for equity capital, they will expand
their equity base only if the rate of return on bank-loans exceeds the cost of
equity-capital. This is why equilibrium bank-spreads [p bR(p)+(1−p)v−RG]
will be strictly greater than banks’ average operating costs, c. Also, given
that bank-spreads are strictly positive in equilibrium, banks have an incentive
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to lend up to the point where the capital constraint binds.20
As is well known, signalling games generally have multiple equilibria. We
argue in this section that this observation may have important implications
for equilibrium bank lending and for the monetary transmission mechanism.
Indeed, we show that a high-lending equilibrium, with low rationally expected
dilution costs and low equilibrium bank-spreads, may exist along with a
low-lending credit-crunch equilibrium, with high spreads and high rationally
expected dilution costs. In this context, even a small change in interest
rates RG induced by monetary policy can have large eﬀects on aggregate
bank lending, if it induces a switch from the high-lending equilibrium to the
low-lending equilibrium, or vice-versa.
Ultimately the relevant equilibrium is tied down by market beliefs and,
as Spence (1974) has compellingly argued, a complete theory of how market
beliefs are formed involves historical, psychological and cultural considera-
tions, which go beyond the scope of our analysis. We can, however, narrow
down somewhat the equilibrium set by appealing to intuitive refinement ideas
along the lines of Cho and Kreps (1987). Nevertheless, as we show in this
section a fundamental multiplicity will remain even after elimination of equi-
libria that are supported by market beliefs that do not satisfy Cho-Kreps’
intuitive criterion. We believe that this is a strength and not a weakness
of the theory, as it provides the underpinnings for the notion of a “credit
crunch” equilibrium.
We begin the section by considering a single bank’s incentive to issue new
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equity given equilibrium rates of return on lending ρH and ρL. We then derive
the optimal amount of equity banks choose to issue, the aggregate supply of
bank credit, and credit spreads in a general equilibrium of the capital and
bank credit market.
In our equilibria, H-banks issue equity only if the bank spread ρH is
high enough and bank loans are suﬃciently lucrative to compensate for the
dilution cost on new equity issues. As for L−banks, they prefer to mimic
H-banks to benefit from better prices on the sale of their shares.
5.1 Bank Owner-Manager Payoﬀs and Optimal equity
issues
To be able to determine a bank’s incentive to issue equity we need first to
derive the return on equity and bank manager’s payoﬀ functions for each
type of bank.
Characterizing the return on equity for each bank type J = H,L turns
out to be straightforward for a type-H bank, but somewhat more involved
for a type-L bank. To simplify our notation we shall denote the return on
equity-capital for a type-J bank by ΓJ . Both types of bank must incur a
cost per asset unit of c > 0, and H-banks earn a unit spread of ρH over RG
on each loan they make, while L-banks earn only pRˆ(p) + (1 − p)βv − RG
on a loan to a firm with a probability of success p. Therefore, we obtain the
following characterization for the return on equity for each bank type.
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Lemma 4: The return on equity-capital for respectively H-banks and
L-banks is given by
ΓH = RG +
ρH − c
κ













The returns ΓH and ΓL are the actual returns for each type of bank.
Investors, however, do not observe banks’ types and can only draw inferences
about a bank’s likely type given the bank’s observed actions, in particular
the bank’s observed equity issue E. We shall denote by ΓE market beliefs
about a bank’s type, conditional on the bank issuing equity E.
We now turn to the characterization of each bank type’s optimal equity
issue decision given market beliefs ΓE. A bank raising an amount of equity
E from new shareholders must relinquish equity ownership α equal to
αΓE(w +E) = E ·RG. (11)
Recall that bank-managers face liquidity shocks which force them to un-
wind their equity holdings with probability λ at date t = 1. Therefore,
as highlighted in Section 2.3, an H-bank owner-manager’s expected payoﬀ
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following a new equity issue E is given by:
(1− α) [λΓE + (1− λ)ΓH ] (w +E).
Under the same market expectations, an L-bank manager’s expected payoﬀ
following a new equity issue E is given by:
(1− α)ΓE(w +E).
The expressions for the payoﬀs of the two types diﬀer because a manager
of an L-bank is always better oﬀ selling his equity stake at date t = 1 than
holding on to it, since the market always (weakly) overvalues the shares of
an L-bank.
Now, if we denote by Γ0 the market’s expected return on equity-capital
when a bank issues no equity (E = 0) and by ΓE the market expected return
on equity-capital when a bank raises an amount of equity E > 0, each type
of bank’s optimal equity issue decision is given by:
Lemma 5: An H-bank manager is better oﬀ issuing equity E > 0 than
issuing no equity if and only if,
ΓE(w +E)−ERG
ΓE
[λΓE + (1− λ)ΓH ] ≥ [λΓ0 + (1− λ)ΓH ]w. (12)
An L-bank manager is better oﬀ issuing equity E > 0 than issuing no equity
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if and only if,
ΓE(w +E)−ERG ≥ Γ0w. (13)
As will become clear in the next section, conditions (12) and (13) will be
central for the determination of the full equilibrium with endogenous bank
equity-capital.
For future reference it is helpful to put more structure on market con-
ditional beliefs ΓE. To that end, recall the timing of moves in our model:
banks begin by quoting lending terms Rˆ(p) to firms and announcing new
equity issues, E.21 Households then respond by deciding how they want to
allocate their savings among the diﬀerent financial instruments, all yielding
an expected return of RG in equilibrium. When evaluating the return on
bank-equity, households will be able to update their beliefs about a bank’s
type given the observed policy of the bank, Rˆ(p) and E. Thus, if we denote
by δH(Rˆ(p), E) and δL(Rˆ(p), E) investors’ updated beliefs about the bank’s
type we have:
Lemma 6: The return on equity-capital ΓE expected by investors in
equilibrium is given by
ΓE = RG +




5.2 Pooling Equilibria in the banking sector
We now turn to the derivation of the aggregate equilibrium supply of bank
loans, by characterizing the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the equity-capital
issue game banks play.
Definition: A Bayes-Nash Equilibrium in the banking sector given RG
and Rˆ(p) is characterized by:
• Banks’ best equity issue strategies, Ei ∈ [0, E], i = H,L given equity-
market conditional beliefs, δH(Rˆ(p), E) and δL(Rˆ(p), E), and
• equity-market conditional beliefs about the bank’s type that are consis-
tent with the banks’ best responses; that is, equity-market conditional
beliefs that are consistent with Bayesian updating.
As one might expect, there may be many Bayes-Nash Equilibria in our
game. We shall show, however, that separating equilibria such that EH 6= EL
do not exist. The intuition for this result is as follows. Two diﬀerent types
of separating equilibria are conceivable. One where the H-bank manager
chooses not to issue equity (EH = 0) while the L-bank manager issues new
equity (EL > 0). The other type of separating equilibrium has the L-bank
and H-bank managers switch roles.22
It is easy to see that the latter type of separating equilibrium cannot
exist. The reason is simply that the L-bank manager would have a profitable
deviation by mimicking the H-bank’ s strategy. This would not only raise
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the L-bank’ s stock price but also allow the bank to sell overvalued equity.
Symmetrically in the former type of separating equilibrium, for an H-bank
to decide not to issue equity in a separating equilibrium in which it incurs no
dilution costs à la Myers-Majluf, it must be the case that loans have a very
low return (namely, ρH < RG). But then it is even less profitable for L-banks
to lend. Therefore, neither H nor L-banks have an incentive to issue equity.
Proposition 3: There exist no separating Bayes-Nash equilibria in the
banking sector, such that EH 6= EL, δH(Rˆ(p), EH) = 1 and δL(Rˆ(p), EL) =
1.
Proof. See the appendix.
Pooling equilibria can be supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs such
that δL(Rˆ(p), Eˆ) = 1 for all Eˆ 6= E.23 A pooling equilibrium with bank
equity-capital issues E is characterized by equilibrium spreads ρH(E), ρL(E)
and interest rates RG(E) given by the unique solution to the equilibrium
equations (9) and (7) such that RG(E) ≥ 1.24
As is to be expected, a continuum of pooling equilibria characterized
by the size of the equilibrium equity issue E ≤ E may exist, since out-of-
equilibrium beliefs can be set arbitrarily. We shall, however, restrict attention
to the pooling equilibria that are best from the point of view of an H-bank
manager, partly on the grounds that the Cho and Kreps intuitive criterion
would select these equilibria over all other pooling equilibria in our game (see
Cho and Kreps, 1987).25
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The optimal equity issue for a typeH-bank, in a pooling equilibrium with
lending terms Rˆ(p) and RG, is generically either 0 or E, as is established in
the following lemma.
Lemma 7: Given lending terms Rˆ(p) such that pRˆ(p)+(1−p)v−RG =
ρH the optimal equity issue for an H-bank under pooling is either:
• E, if δH(Rˆ(p), E)ρH + δL(Rˆ(p), E)ρL > c or,
• 0 if δH(Rˆ(p), E)ρH + δL(Rˆ(p), E)ρL < c or,
• undetermined if δH(Rˆ(p), E)ρH + δL(Rˆ(p), E)ρL = c.
Proof. We compute the sign of the derivative with respect to E of the man-
agers profit. The manager profit’s value is VH(E) =
ΓE(w+E)−ERG
ΓE
[λΓE + (1− λ)ΓH ],
and its derivative’s sign is therefore given by the sign of ΓE−RG, which value
we are able to compute as:
ΓE −RG =
δH(Rˆ(p), E)ρH + δL(Rˆ(p), E)ρL − c
κ
which allow us to conclude.
Consider first the pooling equilibrium with EH = EL = 0. This equilib-
rium admits spreads ρH(0), ρL(0) and interest rates RG(0) ≥ 1, given by the











Similarly, the pooling equilibrium with EH = EL = E admits spreads











When does either of these equilibria obtain? And, can both equilibria
coexist? The next proposition provides suﬃcient conditions under which a
pooling equilibrium always exists and under which both may coexist.
Proposition 4: Under assumptions A1, A2 and
A3 : β <
(1− μ)ρH(E)
ρH(0)− μρH(E)
a pooling equilibrium always exists. When, in addition assumption
A4 : ρH(0)β < min{c+ (1− β)v
μw
2κ
; (1− μ+ μβ)ρH(E)} (19)
holds, both pooling equilibria may coexist.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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We have imposed three conditions to guarantee the existence of at least
one and possibly multiple pooling equilibria with maximal bank lending. The
reader may wonder at this point whether the set of parameters that satisfy
assumptionsA1,A2 andA3 is not an empty set. Careful inspection of these
three conditions reveals that the first two conditions impose a restriction
on G while the third one restricts the values of the parameter β. In the
appendix we provide a numerical example in which both pooling equilibria
with maximal bank lending do coexist. Note also that the range of parameter
values for which pooling equilibria with maximal bank lending exist is larger
than the set of parameters that satisfy assumptionsA1,A2 andA3, as these
are suﬃcient conditions.
Nevertheless, the reader may be concerned about the robustness of our
equilibria. The reason why we require A1, A2 and A3 is that we want to
focus on a specific type of equilibrium where L−banks lend to full capacity.
Clearly, assumption A2 guaranteeing that L-banks want to engage in
maximal lending to firms is unnecessarily restrictive. We only focus on this
equilibrium because it is the simplest to characterize. But an equally plau-
sible equilibrium could be one where L-banks do not lend up to capacity.
An interesting and empirically relevant comparative statics feature of this
equilibrium is that it produces an aggregate bank credit supply function (by
L-banks) that is downward-sloping in RG. Indeed, the higher RG the lower
is ρL, and, therefore, the lower is the credit supply of L-banks. Assump-
tion A1, on the other hand, is quite natural as we do not expect to obtain
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an equilibrium if the amount of government bond issues is not sustainable.
Finally assumption A3 simply allows us to disregard semi-separating equi-
libria which are more cumbersome and do not bring any additional insight
(see Figure 3).
The coexistence of two pooling equilibria is of interest for the study of the
eﬀects of monetary policy. Figure 3 illustrates this case. When the economy is
initially in the high lending equilibrium with EH = EL = E, a contractionary
monetary policy resulting in an increase in RG and a reduction in bank
spreads ρH may induce a switch from the high-lending equilibrium to the
low-lending one characterized by EH = EL = 0 and thus lead to a magnified
contractionary eﬀect. In other words, a contractionary monetary policy may
drive the economy into a region of the parameter space, where only the
pooling equilibrium such that EH = EL = 0 exists. This switch is inevitable
if spreads ρH(E) are reduced to the point where an H-bank finds it optimal
to deviate from the high lending equilibrium policy (EH = EL = E) by
setting EH = 0.
To state this point more formally, if initially the economy is characterized
by a suﬃciently low RG(E) and a suﬃciently high ρH(E) to satisfy:
ΓE(w +E)− E ·RG(E)
ΓE
h








ΓE = Γ¯ = μΓ
E
L + (1− μ)ΓEH ,
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ΓEL = RG(E) +








then, a severe monetary contraction may increase RG(E) and lower ρH(E)








λΓEL + (1− λ)ΓEH
i
w, (21)
in which case it is optimal for banks to deviate from the high lending equi-
librium policy by setting EH = EL = 0.
We interpret the switch from the equilibrium with high bank-equity capi-
tal to the one with low equity-capital as a form of credit crunch induced by a
bank equity crunch similar to the credit crunch in some Northeastern States
in 1990 described by Bernanke and Lown (1991).
To summarize, a key prediction of our analysis in this section is that a
monetary tightening not only brings about the expected increase in the cost
of borrowing RG and RG + ρH , but as it induces a decrease in bank spreads
ρH , it also reduces banks’ incentives to increase their equity-capital base.
Capital-adequacy regulations thus may induce a decrease in the supply of
loans through a contraction of the equity-capital base and thus magnify the
contractionary eﬀect of monetary policy.
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6 Comparative Statics and the Eﬀects of
Monetary Policy
Having highlighted how changes in interest rates may produce a switch from a
high bank lending equilibrium to a credit crunch equilibrium, we now turn to
a discussion of ‘local’ eﬀects of monetary policy by exploring the comparative
statics of changes in G. We shall illustrate these comparative statics eﬀects
in a diagram and we confine the formal analysis to the appendix. What we
have in mind here is a Central Bank holding a stock of T-bills and conducting
monetary policy by buying and selling these bills against cash. An expan-
sionary monetary policy is then implemented by buying T-bills (decreasing
G) and a contractionary one by increasing G.
The eﬀect of an increase in G is displayed in Figure 4 below. When
the supply of bonds increases from G to G0, it does not aﬀect the credit
market equilibrium schedule, as equation (7) is independent of G. However,
it shifts the security market equilibrium schedule (9) outward, as government
borrowing crowds out corporate and bank bond issuers. One expected eﬀect
of increased government borrowing is an increase in interest rates, RG. The
other eﬀect in our model is a decrease in bank spreads ρH . The reason why
bank spreads must decrease is that otherwise total demand for bank loans
would decrease to a point where banks would not be able to lend to capacity.
But then it would be profitable for banks to lower ρH slightly to be able to
lend more (see Figure 4).
46
These eﬀects on ρH and RG in turn aﬀect the equilibrium level of bank
lending and bond issues by shifting overall financing to safer firms. That is,
both p(RG+ρH) and p∗1(RG+ρH) shift to the right by an amount proportional
to the increase in G (see the appendix), so that total bank lending remains
unchanged, but the increased supply of T-bills partially crowds out corporate
bond issues. It does not fully crowd out corporate bond issues since the
increase in RG also induces an increase in savings.26
Thus, the eﬀect of a monetary tightening on individual firms is to cut
oﬀ the riskiest firms from bank lending and to induce substitution of bond
financing for relatively cheaper bank lending at the firms with the lowest
bond ratings. Overall, the total share of bank lending to corporate bond
issues increases in response to a monetary tightening. We summarize these
findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 5: Eﬀects of open market operations: A contrac-
tionary monetary policy (increase in G) has the eﬀect of : i) increasing T-bill
rates RG, ii) decreasing bank spreads ρH , iii) increasing the overall cost of
bank loansRG+ρH , iv) decreasing corporate bond issues by an amount that is
smaller than the additional amount of government borrowing and, v) leaving
the aggregate amount of bank lending unchanged. However, bank lending
is now directed to safer firms, so that on balance it is the marginal firms
with the highest risks that are forced out of investment by the tightening in
monetary policy.
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Proof. See the appendix.
Thus, for the pooling equilibria with maximal bank lending we have fo-
cused on, the only local eﬀect of a monetary tightening and reduction in bank
spreads is to change the composition of financing. Aggregate bank lending
remains unchanged, but there is a shift away from bond financing towards
borrowing through bank loans. However, when equilibrium bank spreads
decrease to the point that assumption A2 no longer holds then a further
increase in RG also induces L−banks to switch away from direct lending to
the corporate sector to investing in securities. This switch will then result in
a contraction of aggregate bank lending.
How do these results relate to empirical findings? The recent empirical
literature on the monetary transmission mechanism has uncovered one broad
finding on the composition eﬀects of a contractionary policy. Kashyap, Stein
and Wilcox (1993) have found that an important response to a monetary
tightening is a surge in commercial paper issuance. They interpret this find-
ing as a change in the composition of financing by firms in response to a
monetary tightening: firms substituting bank debt for commercial paper.
However, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1995) find
that the main factor behind this surge in commercial paper issuance is inven-
tory build-up by large firms financed by commercial paper issuance. Small
firms do not rely on commercial paper issues at all. Moreover, these firms
bear the brunt of the monetary tightening. Thus, the story that seems to
emerge from these studies is that:
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“..the main eﬀect of a monetary contraction is to shift financ-
ing of all types from small firms to large firms. This shift pro-
duces a decline in the aggregate bank-loan share because large
firms rely less heavily on bank debt than do small firms.” [Oliner
and Rudebusch, pp 301]
Our results are consistent with these findings to the extent that they
explain the shift in overall financing from small (or riskier) firms to large (or
safer) firms that results from an increase in interest rates RG. They seem,
however, in contradiction with the empirical evidence to the extent that in
our model the aggregate bank loan share can increase as a result of the
monetary tightening. But, note that our results concern the aggregate share
of bank lending to long-term bond issues and not the share of bank lending
to commercial paper or other short term debt, which is the focus of most of
the empirical literature. The only study that investigates the ratio of bank
loans to long term bonds is Gertler and Gilchrist (1983). They show that
this ratio only declines slightly following a tightening in monetary policy.27
Note also that our result that ρH decreases in response to a monetary
tightening is consistent with the stylized fact that the yield on bank loans is
sticky relative to the Treasury rate. Our model thus provides an alternative
explanation for the observed stickiness of bank loan rates.
Other comparative statics eﬀects could be explored, such as the eﬀects of
a tightening in capital regulations (an increase in κ) a change in the quality
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composition of banks (a change in μ, or a change in β) a change in the
profitability of investment projects (a change in V or v). For lack of space
we omit the discussion of these eﬀects. But, it should be clear that the
analysis of the comparative statics with respect to G can be easily adapted
to explore these eﬀects.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model of the interface between corporate financing
decisions and monetary policy in a general equilibrium model (of the capital
market), which traces the eﬀects of monetary policy on firms’ investment
decisions.
The model developed here, which abstracts from many other relevant
considerations generates several qualitative predictions about the joint equi-
librium in the credit and securities markets and the eﬀects of open market
operations on the real sector, which are broadly consistent with stylized facts
on the eﬀects of monetary policy on investment and firm financing uncovered
by recent empirical studies.
The model considered in this paper is already somewhat complex and
we have chosen to leave some interesting extensions for future research. An
obvious immediate extension is to diﬀerentiate firms according to both the
underlying risk of their cash flows and their size. If, in addition, one then in-
troduces a fixed issuing cost for bonds (representing legal and administrative
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costs) we would expect to obtain an equilibrium segmentation where only
the largest and safest firms issue bonds. Such a model could also be used to
investigate how the size distribution of firms as well as the relative costs of
securitization aﬀect the aggregate composition of financing in the economy.
Another obvious but more ambitious extension is to introduce a final
goods market and sticky prices. Extending the model to a multiperiod setting
in order to explore the dynamics of the monetary transmission mechanism is
perhaps the most interesting and diﬃcult challenge.
8 Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3: The two functions ψH and ψL below represent the
net payoﬀ of issuing equity worth E = E instead of E = 0, for respectively
an H and an L-bank:






−λ (Γ0 − ΓE)w
and
ψL(ΓE,Γ0) = (ΓE −RG)E − (Γ0 − ΓE)w (23)
Combining expressions (22) and (23) yields the following convenient expres-
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sion:




The diﬀerent types of equilibria are characterized by the values of the
functions ψH and ψL, as follows:
1. The pooling equilibrium with E = 0 is such that ψH(ΓE,Γ0) ≤ 0 and
ψL(ΓE,Γ0) ≤ 0.
2. The pooling equilibrium with E = E is such that ψH(ΓE,Γ0) ≥ 0 and
ψL(ΓE,Γ0) ≥ 0.
3. Separating equilibria are such that ψH(ΓE,Γ0) > 0 and ψL(ΓE,Γ0) ≤ 0
or ψH(ΓE,Γ0) ≤ 0 and ψL(ΓE,Γ0) > 0.
4. Semi-separating equilibria are such that either
ψL(ΓE,Γ0) = 0 or ψH(ΓE,Γ0) = 0,
so that either or both types are indiﬀerent between issuing or not issuing
new equity.
To prove Proposition 3, we first establish a preliminary lemma:
Lemma 3: i) If ΓE > RG,then ψL(ΓE,Γ0) ≥ 0 implies ψH(ΓE,Γ0) > 0
ii) If ΓE < RG, then ψL(ΓE,Γ0) ≤ 0 implies ψH(ΓE,Γ0) < 0





that if ΓE = RG, ψH(ΓE,Γ0) = 0
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Proof of lemma 3: This is straightforward using (24).
We now proceed to prove proposition 3: Lemma 3 implies that




As a result, if ψH > 0, we have ΓE−RG > 0, but then the equilibrium beliefs
are such that Γ0 = ΓL, and expression (23) tells us that ψL is the sum of
two positive terms, a contradiction. If instead, ψH < 0, then, symmetrically,
this implies ΓE −RG < 0, and equilibrium beliefs are such that ΓE = ΓL, so
that expression (23) is the sum of two negative terms, again contradicting
ψL = 0. This establishes the proposition.
Lemma 4: The return on equity-capital for respectively H-banks and
L-banks is given by
ΓH = RG +
ρH − c
κ













Proof of Lemma 4: The expression for the return on equity-capital for
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ΓL(p) = RG +




ΓL = RG +











or, after substituting for pL and p∗,
ΓL = RG +













, ρL(ρH) = ρHβ − Z and rearranging we
obtain the desired expression for the the return on equity-capital for L-banks.
Lemma 5: An H-bank manager is better oﬀ issuing equity E > 0 than
issuing no equity if and only if,
ΓE(w +E)−ERG
ΓE
[λΓE + (1− λ)ΓH ] ≥ [λΓ0 + (1− λ)ΓH ]w. (25)
An L-bank manager is better oﬀ issuing equity E > 0 than issuing no equity
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if and only if,
ΓE(w +E)−ERG ≥ Γ0w. (26)
Proof of Lemma 5: An H-bank owner-manager making a new equity
issue E and holding on to her shares until date t = 2 gets an expected return
(1 − α)ΓH(w + E). The same manager making a new equity issue E and
selling her shares at date t = 1, before loan returns are realized and the
bank’s type is revealed gets (1− α)ΓE(w+E). Substituting for the value of




[λΓE + (1− λ)ΓH ] (27)
Similarly, the manager’s expected payoﬀ from issuing no equity is given
by λΓ0 + (1− λ)ΓHw. Comparing these payoﬀs, we obtain condition (12).
Under the same market expectations, an L-bank manager issuing equity
E > 0 gets an expected return ΓE(w + E) − ERG, and a payoﬀ Γ0w when
issuing no equity. Comparing these payoﬀs we obtain condition (13).
Lemma 6: The return on equity-capital ΓE expected by investors in
equilibrium is given by
ΓE = RG +
δH(Rˆ(p), E)ρH + δL(Rˆ(p), E)ρL − c
κ
(28)
Proof of Lemma 6: Given the observed bank actions Rˆ(p) and E,
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investors’ updated beliefs about the bank’s type are:
ΓE = δH(Rˆ(p), E)ΓH + δL(Rˆ(p), E)ΓL
Substituting for ΓH and ΓL and rearranging we obtain the desired expression.













Γ0L(w +E)−ERG(0) ≤ Γ0w (30)
where,
Γ0 = Γ¯ = μΓ0L + (1− μ)Γ0H ,








It is easy to see that inequalities (29) and (30) both hold when Γ0L ≤ RG(0).
Thus, a suﬃcient condition for this pooling equilibrium to exist is that
c+ Z0 ≥ ρH(0)β, (31)
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where




Consider next the pooling equilibrium with EH = EL = E. Again, for this
equilibrium to exist we must have
ΓE(w +E)− E ·RG(E)
ΓE
h








ΓE(w +E)−ERG(E) ≥ ΓELw (33)
where,
ΓE = Γ¯ = μΓ
E
L + (1− μ)ΓEH ,








Note that inequalities (32) and (33) both hold when ΓE ≥ RG(E). This
latter inequality in turn is equivalent to
c ≤ (1− μ)ρH(E) + μρL(E)
or,
c+ ZE ≤ (1− μ+ μβ)ρH(E),
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where








Thus, a suﬃcient condition for the pooling equilibrium with EH = EL = E
to exist is that
c+ ZE ≤ (1− μ+ μβ)ρH(E) (34)
In sum, if (31) holds then the pooling equilibrium with E = 0 exists. If,
however, (31) does not hold, but






then (34) holds and the pooling equilibrium with E = E¯ exists. Indeed, we
then have
c+ ZE ≤ ρH(0)β ≤ (1− μ+ μβ)ρH(E).
Thus, when conditionA3 holds a pooling equilibrium always exists. What is
more, both pooling equilibria (with respectively E = 0 and E = E¯) coexist
when
A4 : ρH(0)β < min{c+ (1− β)v
μw
2κ
; (1− μ+ μβ)ρH(E)} (35)
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Proof. proposition 5: We use Cramer’s rule to prove the diﬀerent
comparative statics results in the equilibrium where RG > 1. Define first
the functions Φ(RG, ρH) and Ω(RG, ρH) from equations (7) and (9) so that
both have zero on the RHS:


















































































(V − v) > 0.














In words, there is a shift of bank lending towards safer firms with a constant
aggregate amount of bank lending lending. Thus, the eﬀect of an increase in
G is only to reduce the size of the corporate bond market.
8.1 An example
We have imposed a number of conditions to guarantee the existence of at
least one and possibly multiple pooling equilibria (with maximal bank lend-
ing and no junk-bond financing). The reader may wonder whether the set
of parameters that satisfy assumptions A1, A2 and A3 is an empty set and
whether there are indeed parameter values for which multiple pooling equi-
libria may exist. For this reason we provide a numerical example below in
which multiple pooling equilibria, with maximal bank lending and no junk
bond financing, exist.
Let the value of corporate projects be V = 2 and v = 1
2
. Next, let bank
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characteristics be:
κ = 0.08, w = 0.01, E = 0.01, μ = 0.1, c = 0.1, λ = 0.5, β = 0.5. Set
government borrowing at G = 0.1.
Then, straightforward calculations yield:
• E+wκ = 0.25,
• A(0) = 0.90625,
• B(0) = 0.785,
• A(0)− B(0) = 0.12125,
• A(E) = 0.8125,
• B(E) = 0.66,
• A(E)− B(E) = 0.1525.
Combining (7) and (9) we obtain a quadratic equation:





• RG(0) = 1.128573961 for E = 0 and,
• RG(E) = 1.164061293 for E = E.
Replacing for RG in either (7) or (9) then yields:
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• ρH(0) = 0.17098151 and therefore ρL(0) = 0.054240755, and
• ρH(E) = 0.115234677 and therefore ρL(E) = 0.026367338.
For these values of bank spreads, L-banks prefer to lend to firms rather
than invest in the financial market. This can be seen by observing that the
spread ρL(E, pL(E)) on the riskiest firm pL(E) is positive for these numbers:
ρH(E)− (1− pL(E))(1− β)v ≥ 0 for E = 0, E.








and get pL(0) = 0.87901849 and pL(E) = 0.922265323. From these values
we then check that the spread ρL(E, pL(E)) on the riskiest firm is positive
for E = 0, E. For the parameter values of our example we get: ρL(0, pL(0)) =
0023995377 and ρL(0, pL(0)) = 0.006933669, which are both positive.
Using these numbers it is also easy to check that assumptions A1 and








Assumption A3 also holds since βρH(0) = 0.085490755 while (1 − μ +
μβ)ρH(E) = 0.109472943.
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Finally to check the existence of the two pooling equilibria we compute
the returns on bank equity:
• Γ0H = 2.015842833,
• Γ0L = 0.556583397,
• Γ0 = 1.869916889,
• ΓEH = 1.354494752,
• ΓEL = 0.243653023, and
• ΓE = 1.243410579.












Γ0L(w +E)−ERG(0) ≤ Γ0w (38)








λΓ0 + (1− λ)Γ0H
¤
w = −0.019784844.
The second condition is also satisfied, since Γ0L −RG(0) < 0.
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Finally, the pooling equilibrium with EH = EL = E also exists if
ΓE(w +E)− E ·RG(E)
ΓE
h








ΓE(w +E)−ERG(E) ≥ ΓELw (40)








λΓEL + (1− λ)ΓEH
i
w = 0.005827725
And the second condition also holds as ΓE > RG.
9 Appendix: Non-binding capital adequacy
constraints
In practice, most banks have an equity capital base in excess of the BIS equity
capital requirement. If equity capital involves a higher cost of capital than
other sources of external funding, the obvious question arises, why banks
hold equity capital in excess of regulatory requirements.
The answer seems to be that banks want to maintain a lending capacity
to be able to meet unexpected new lending opportunities or to be able to
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carry out future loan commitments. We can model this idea by assuming that
when a firm debt is to be renegotiated, it involves a complete restructuring
with an additional cash injection that we assume equal to l1. Obviously, if
the firm is successful at time 1, no additional external funds are required.
Assumptions A0 and A1 have then to be adapted:
AssumptionA0 stating that the average project has a positive net present
value has to be modified as follows:
A0: πH + νπH − (1− p1)l1 > 1 + ω
For simplicity we assume that banks can only issue equity at time 0, (In
practice it is diﬃcult to tap the equity market too often). Then, the bank is
able to compute its time 1 capital constraint
E1
L1
≥ κ ≥ 0
where L1 is the amount of outstanding loans at time 1, (which depends
on the expected amount of additional loans,
R p∗1
pB1
(1−p1)dp1 , the nominal rate
on these loans, the expected repayment, πH
R
p1dp1 as well as the expected
loan losses (L0−A)(1−ν)
R
p1dp1)) and E1 is the equity capital base at time
t = 1, which includes time zero net profits if we assume a zero dividend at
time t = 0.
Depending on the expected amount of profit, additional loans and loan
losses, the binding capital constraint will be the one at time t = 1 while
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it will not be binding at time t = 0. Thus, we will observe equity capital
slack because of the profitability of making additional loans to good firms in
distress. Notice therefore that the slack will depend upon the business cycle
since the proportion of good firms in distress, the proportion of repayments
and the banks profits themselves depend upon the business cycle.
There is an additional condition that is required for banks to perform
their role in the loan renegotiation process, that a loan to a firm in distress




This condition which is absolutely natural when we think in terms of
the incentives and of the credibility of banks to renegotiate their loans is also
interesting as it shows banks benefiting from their captive unlucky borrowers.
This condition will always hold for high cash flows πH and low cost overruns
l1 and low future expected profitability on new loans ρH .
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1See, e.g. Berger A.N. and G. F. Udell, p.655 (1998) for a review of the
empirical literature on the credit crunch.
2‘Bank spreads’ here refer to the diﬀerence between the expected return on
a bank loan and the yield on government bonds. These spreads are diﬃcult
to measure accurately, as banks do not systematically disclose the precise
lending terms on the loans they extend.
3From a conceptual point of view, a common weakness of models which
allow for only bank lending without any other direct source of funding for
firms is that banks in these models look essentially like non-financial firms,
the only diﬀerence being that they are subject to capital adequacy require-
ments.
4However, these options are examined in Bolton and Freixas (2000) for
firms with a richer cash-flow structure.
5We assume for convenience that the bank appropriates the entire restruc-
turing value. In other words, the bank is an informational monopoly able to
extract the entire continuation value as in Rajan (1992). Of, course, banks’
ability to extract this value will be anticipated by borrowers and priced into
the ex-ante loan terms.
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6We restrict attention to parameter values such that the riskiest firms do
not issue junk bonds in equilibrium. As we point out in Bolton and Freixas
(2000) this is an option that may be attractive to the riskiest firms for some
constellation of parameters.
7In Bolton and Freixas (2000) these fund raising costs were specified ex-
ogenously. In contrast, here these costs are endogenized.
8Since in our model, banks do not default this condition is the same even
in the absence of deposit insurance. If banks could default with positive
probability then we would have to introduce a demand for the payment
services associated with deposits, so as to make bank deposits attractive
while preserving their option to invest in T-Bills as an investment vehicle
that does not generate losses.
9The BIS capital adequacy rules in our highly simplified model are that
κ = 0.08 for standard unsecured loans.
10We justify the existence of an upper bound on E by the following po-
tential incentive problem between bank mangers and bank shareholders: if
the bank raises an amount superior to E then bank managers may have an
incentive to abscond with the money or use it to increase their private ben-
efits. Indeed, the larger is E the greater the private benefits relative to the
cost in terms of loss of reputation.
11Note that this objective function is similar to that considered by Myers
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and Majluf (1984) but it is not vulnerable to the criticisms voiced against
their specification (see e.g. Dybvig and Zender (1989)).
12More precisely, in Proposition 3 we establish that only pooling or semi-
separating equilibria exist.
13We do not consider outcomes where ρH < 0, since banks always have the
option to invest in securities, which provide a zero spread.
14There are number of possible equilibrium outcomes in our model. In
some equilibria there is a ‘junk-bond’ financed segment of firms. These are
highly risky firms that prefer bank financing, but are not able to aﬀord the
intermediation cost. In other equilibria L-banks do not extend any bank
loans at all, or do not lend to capacity, as they cannot find enough firms
to lend to that provide a suﬃciently high return (recall that L-banks are
only able to generate a restructuring return βv (with 1 > β) where H-banks
generate a return v). Although these equilibria are of interest, we shall not
analyze them, as they lead to a parallel, possibly more cumbersome analysis
of the bank-capital monetary policy transmission channel.
15This does not mean, however, that riskier firms have to meet higher
contractual repayments bR(p). In fact, it is easy to show that assumption A1
implies that firms with higher risks will pay higher interest rates. The reason
is simply that firms with higher risks also generate lower expected returns.
16The partition of firms into three classes, those that are credit rationed,
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those that are bank financed, and those that are financed through securities
issues has been obtained in earlier models but for diﬀerent reasons. Holm-
strom and Tirole (1997), for example, emphasize the role of collateral, and
have firms with more collateral issue securities. Berger and Udell (1991), on
the other hand, assume that firms diﬀer in the extent of their private infor-
mation and obtain that those firms that have a higher level of asymmetric
information are credit rationed, those with the least asymmetric information
are funded by financial markets (arm length finance) and those in between
are funded by banks through monitored finance.
17Note that assumption A1 implies that pB1 > 0 for ρH > 0.
18As we have pointed out, firms with p < pB may be unable to get a bank
loan but may possibly be able to get junk-bond financing. The minimum
p for which bond financing is available is given by pV = RG. If RGV < p
B
then clearly the segment of risks between RGV and p
B would be able to issue
junk-bonds. We do not consider such equilibria, as they are somewhat of a
distraction.
19To see this, note that if x > (1 − pL(x))(1 − β)v then y > x implies
that y > (1 − pL(y))(1 − β)v. Indeed, replacing pL(x) by its value, yields,
x > (xv + μ
w+E
κ ))(1 − β)v,which is equivalent to βx > μ(
w+E
κ )(1 − β)v.
Therefore, if this inequality holds for x it must also hold for y > x.
20This is always true in our model forH−banks, but only true for L−banks
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under assumption A2. We also explain in appendix B that dynamic con-
siderations may induce banks to keep a small equity-capital ‘cushion’, for
inventory-management reasons. This is an additional reason why banks in
reality hold equity-capital in excess of 8 percent.
21In general one might expect that H-banks would make diﬀerent equity
issue decisions EH than the decisions EL by L-banks. However, as the next
section makes clear, in our model only pooling equilibria such that EH =
EL = E can exist.
22Or, to issue less new equity.
23Semi-separating equilibria, where one or both of the types randomize
over two levels of equity issues Eˆ = 0 and Eˆ > 0, may also exist. To avoid a
lengthy digression, we shall not consider semi-separating equilibria here.
24This system of equations admits two possible solutions for RG(E) and
ρH(E), but only one root RG(E) is greater than one under assumptions A1
and A2.
25Note that our qualitative results and comparative statics analysis do not
depend on this refinement in any way. What is important for our analysis
is essentially that pooling equilibria do indeed exist and that bank lending
may vary with equity-market beliefs.
26An interesting observation emerging from this analysis is that it is pos-
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sible to observe at the same time a reduction in bank spreads, accompanied
by a contraction in aggregate private investment, and an increase in the
remuneration of deposits.
27The model we have considered here is an oversimplification of reality to
the extent that we have ruled out equity financing by firms. In Bolton and
Freixas (2000) we allow firms to raise funds in any form they like, including
equity. The analysis in that model suggests that another possible eﬀect of
a monetary tightening is to induce substitution away from equity financing
towards bank lending and bond financing.
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